Copyright law must strike a delicate balance between the long-term need to encourage innovation and the short-term use of work already created (Arnold Plant, 1934; William D. Nordhaus, 1969). This balance depends on the extent to which stronger copyright protection actually stimulates creative activity, which in turn depends on two effects. One is the impact of copyright on the income of authors of books, movies, music, software, and other creative work. The other is the effect of the economic incentive in stimulating more creative activity.

Debate on these issues ranges from scholarly arguments that the extent of copyright is excessive (Lawrence Lessig, 2001; Michele Boldrin and David Levine, 2002) to industry calls for expanding the length and scope of copyright. The debate, however, has not been much informed by empirical research, other than fragmentary evidence that the United States’ 1891 extension of copyright law to foreigners had little impact on American and English authors (Plant, 1934; B. Zorina Khan, 2001) and that British composers and musicians receive minimal royalty income (Ruth Towse, 2000).

In this paper, we investigate the impact of economic incentives on the international supply of big-screen movies. More particularly, we also study the impact of a 1998 increase in the term of copyright on U.S. movie production.

I. Setting

The demand and supply of motion pictures, on a national basis, can be characterized by the following structural equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{Q_D}{1+a_0+a_1P+a_2VTR+a_3TV} &= a_4PDI + a_5POP + \epsilon \\
\frac{Q_S}{b_0+b_1P+u} &= b_1
\end{align*}
\]

where \( Q_D \) and \( Q_S \) denote the quantities of movies demanded and supplied, respectively; \( P \) represents the “price” of movies; \( VTR \) and \( TV \) represent the ownership of videotape recorders and televisions, respectively; and \( PDI \) and \( POP \) denote personal disposable income and population, respectively.

Regarding equation (1), the demand for movies is elastic (Erwin A. Blackstone and Gary W. Bowman, 1999); hence \( a_1 < 0 \). Since many households “consume” movies as prerecorded videotapes, we expect \( a_2 > 0 \). The impact of TV ownership on the demand for movies is more complicated. People also “consume” movies through cable and free-to-the-air television channels. However, television programs compete with movie theaters for consumers’ leisure time. Accordingly, \( a_3 \) might be positive or negative. As for the effects of income and population, we expect \( a_4 > 0 \) and \( a_5 > 0 \). Regarding the supply equation, we expect \( b_1 \geq 0 \).

In movie market equilibrium, \( Q_D = Q_S \). Since movies are distributed in diverse ways, including cinema exhibition, cable and free-to-the-air television broadcast, and prerecorded videotapes, the “price” of movies is rather nebulous. Hence, we use equation (2) to substitute for price in equation (1) to derive the following equilibrium relation:

\[
(1 - \frac{a_1}{b_1})Q = (a_0 - \frac{a_1}{b_1}b_0) + a_2VTR + a_3TV + a_4PDI + a_5POP + \left( \epsilon - \frac{a_1}{b_1}u \right).
\]

In the empirical work, we estimate equation (3) and investigate two questions. The first...
relates to the impact of economic incentives on the supply of creative work. We examine this indirectly by investigating how the ownership of videotape recorders and personal income affect movie production.\(^2\) If the movie supply is completely inelastic, \(b_1 = 0\), then all the coefficients estimated, except the constant and random error, would be close to zero. By contrast, if we find empirically that the estimated coefficients \(a_2, \ldots, a_5\) are significantly different from zero, then we can infer that \(b_1 > 0\), and that movie production does respond to economic incentives.

Our second question concerns the impact of a change in U.S. copyright law in 1998 on movie production. Pursuant to the 1976 Copyright Act, the term of copyright was the author’s life plus 50 years. In 1998, Congress passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the term to the author’s life plus 70 years (Paul Goldstein, 1998 section 4.7). We investigate whether this extension of 20 years led to an increase in U.S. movie production.

II. Data

We obtained information on big-screen movies from the Internet Movie Database (IMDB). The IMDB reports movies and television series by country of production and year. For each of 38 countries, including major movie markets such as Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, we counted movies of over 60 minutes’ length that were not made specifically for television or videotape.

We collected data on national ownership of videotape recorders and TV sets (color and black-and-white), personal disposable income, and population from the Global Market Information Database (GMID). Owing to data limitations, we confined our study to 1990–2000. We compiled a total of 418 observations. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the sample.

Empirically, the variables TV and POP were highly collinear (correlation coefficient \(\approx 0.9\)). We excluded POP from further analysis as it was also closely related to country-level fixed effects that we included to capture systematic unobserved national differences in movie demand.

Finally, the variable VTR was endogenous to the extent that the availability of movies influences the purchase of videotape recorders. To account for possible endogeneity, we used ownership of hi-fi stereos and CD players, collected from the GMID, as instruments for VTR.

III. Results

Table 2 presents regressions of movie production on VTR, TV, and PDI with country and year fixed effects, using both ordinary (OLS) and two-stage (2SLS) least-squares methods. The OLS and 2SLS results were quite similar. (For brevity, we do not report the country and year fixed effects.)
Referring to equation (3), since \( a_1 < 0 \) and \( b_1 \geq 0 \), the term \((1 - a_1/b_1)\) is positive, and hence, \( a_2, a_3, \) and \( a_4 \) have the same signs as the estimated coefficients of VTR, TV, and PDI, respectively. Consistent with our a priori expectations, the coefficients of VTR and PDI were positive and significant. These results imply that the supply of movies was indeed elastic and, in particular, sensitive to shifts in demand arising from changes in videotape player ownership and personal income.

In the year 2000, U.S. ownership of videotape players was 85.5 million units and 1,305 movies were produced. Based on our empirical estimates, a 1-percent increase in player ownership (0.855 million units) would have been associated with an increase in movie production by 11.9–14.7 units or 0.9–1.1 percent.

The effect of TV ownership was negative and marginally significant, which suggests that the substitution between watching television and going to movie theaters outweighed the distribution of movies through television and population growth (recall that the TV variable was collinear with population). Finally, movie production was subject to secular decline: all the time dummies were negative and significant.

We next addressed the impact of the Sonny Bono Act on U.S. movie production. We estimated equation (3) using the subsample of U.S. data with a linear year trend instead of year dummy variables, to preserve degrees of freedom. We added an indicator variable BONO, which was set to 1 for years 1999–2000 (after the Act was passed), and 0 otherwise. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the U.S. sample.

Table 4 reports the OLS results. The coefficients of VTR, TV, and PDI had the same signs as in the international regressions reported in Table 2. However, standard errors were relatively larger, which might be expected with only 11 observations. Nevertheless, the coefficients of VTR and PDI were close to significant at the 10-percent level.

Comparing the regressions with and without the indicator BONO, the additional variable did not improve the model fit and served to inflate the standard errors of the various coefficients. The coefficient of BONO was positive, but not statistically significant. A one-tailed test did not support the hypothesis that the Sonny Bono Act led to an increase in U.S. movie production.

IV. Concluding Remarks

We found strong evidence that, at least in the case of movies, the supply of creative work did respond to economic incentives. As for the Sonny Bono Act, it appeared to have been a giveaway to owners of existing creative work, while having relatively little impact on new creative activity.

Future work could draw data on registrations of books and sound recordings from the U.S. Copyright Office to test the impact of other major changes in U.S. copyright law on the supply of creative work. Two events stand out

---

Table 3—Descriptive Statistics, U.S. Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movies</td>
<td></td>
<td>708.458</td>
<td>227.588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTR millions</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.048</td>
<td>19.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV millions</td>
<td></td>
<td>88.953</td>
<td>9.522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposable income</td>
<td>$10^12</td>
<td>5.505</td>
<td>0.876</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4—U.S. Movie Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Without BONO</th>
<th>With BONO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4,094.516</td>
<td>-4,518.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTR millions</td>
<td>(6,918.980)</td>
<td>(7,549.750)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV millions</td>
<td>-118.509</td>
<td>-111.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI</td>
<td>1,544.683*</td>
<td>1,339.515*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>-522.220*</td>
<td>-500.966*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONO</td>
<td>68.599</td>
<td>(177.929)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N: 11
Adjusted \( R^2 \): 0.8558 0.8320

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All significance levels, except for BONO, were calculated using two-tailed tests.

* Statistically significant at the 5-percent level.

---

Footnote: For efficiency, we did not apply 2SLS, as the subsample contained only 11 observations.
in recent years. The 1976 Copyright Act drastically increased the term of U.S. copyright from 28 years, renewable for another 28 years, to the author’s life plus 50 years. The other major event was the Supreme Court’s 1991 *Feist* decision that telephone directories were not protected by copyright.*

REFERENCES


Towe, Ruth. “Copyright and the Cultural Industries: Incentives and Earnings.” Unpublished manuscript, Department for the Study of the Arts and Culture, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, Netherlands, October 2000.


---